Does it make sense to bike without a helmet?

The blog post “Why it makes sense to bike without a helmet” is giving me a headache. It is wrong, wrong, wrong, yet it’s surprisingly difficult to point out exactly why. The author argues that  “if we start looking into the research, there’s a strong argument to be made that wearing a bike helmet may actually increase your risk of injury, and increase the risk of injury of all the cyclists around you.”

The author essentially argues that by sacrificing some personal safety now, he can improve the safety of everyone in the future. That is a laudable attitude. But is he actually doing that? I am becoming more and more interested in cycling safety as I am turning greener and greener. Thus, this needs to be analyzed out.  A faulty argument in favor of a good cause is not acceptable.

The author cites an impressive number of statistics, but the arguments seem to be quite simply invalid. Correlation and causality have been confused, and so on. Multiple errors. It would be easy to shrug it off, but the post has been shared and discussed widely.

Also… it’s way too lazy to just sit on the sidelines and criticize. The author bravely went out on a limb and said something controversial, even though it seems he’s completely wrong.  So, here’s a counterquestion that respects that bravery: are there any conditions under which he would in fact be correct?

The logical chain

Here’s my reconstruction of the main logic of the blog. These are not the exact claims of the author, but something that can be inferred from the text. The mathematical additions are mine.

1. Helmets decrease the risk of serious injury, if a cyclist has an accident. This is a Bayesian variable: p(S|A). p(S|A) is smaller if one wears a helmet.  The probability of severe injury is then p(S)=p(S|A)*p(A)

2. Currently, the probability p(A) of being in an accident is relatively high when cycling. For someone who cycles a lot, it is probably in the range of 1% per year (my estimate).

3. If cities were optimized for biking, the probability of an accident p(A) would be much lower than it is now. Biking might not be any more dangerous than driving a car or walking. At that point, it would be irrelevant whether or not one wore a helmet.

4. To force cities to be optimized for biking, one must motivate the maximum number of people (N) to cycle for maximal amounts of time (T); that is, maximize the amount of cycling, C=N*T. The larger C is, the smaller p(A) will be.  For future reference, note that C can be considered to be general measure of how attractive cycling is perceived to be.

We don’t really know how to model the effect. However, for lack of a better model, we could assume that it follows the exponential distribution p(A)~f(λ,C)=λ*exp(-λ*C) which has mean 1/λ. Since we can scale the constants freely, let us set λ=1. Then, the current probability of an accident is P0=exp(-C0). We want to evaluate how the probablity changes as C changes.

5. Mandatory helmet use is likely to decrease both the number of cyclists, and the time used for casual cycling. We can call this the F-factor, as in “F you”, where F<1. Then the accident probability given mandatory helmets is p(F)=exp(-C0*F) = P0^F.

Rough estimate: if the current personal probability of an accident per year is 1%, and a mandatory helmet decreases cycling by 10% so that F=0.9, then the mandatory helmet would raise the personal probability to (0.01)^(0.9) or 1.6%.

6. Therefore, mandatory helmet use will slow down the target of creating a biking-optimized city, and increase the probability of being in an accident. Up to here, the arguments may actually be valid. However, now it starts to break down.

What is missing 1: Going from big F to little f

There is a problem here. Whether an individual wears or does not wear a helmet does not have any bearing on whether the government does or does not make helmets mandatory.

The author seems to imply that using a helmet is “giving in”: it is a signal to society that cyclists can be trampled on. This sounds vague, but let’s model it in any case. We could consider such an effect to be similar to the F-factor, in that it makes cycling less attractive to everyone. We can even model it similarly, calling it small f.

Using a helmet would thus increase the probability of being involved in an accident to P0^f. Note that by our definitions, f is larger than F; a small effect means that the value of f is close to 1.

What is missing 2: going from probability to risk

Why does this sound completely unsatisfactory? Because we are missing something crucial. We really need to look at risk rather than probability alone. Risk is the product of the probability times the impact (almost literally, in this case). We can call this damage parameter D. (The units could for example be the cost of emergency brain surgery).

The amount of damage we can expect in an accident depends on helmet use. With a helmet it is D0, without a helmet it is D1.  Set D0 to 1 for simplicity. We know that D1>>1. For very serious head injuries, which really are the crucial ones, D1 might be 10 or more.

We can then calculate a damage matrix. The calculation is identical for small f.

Screen shot 2014-05-08 at 11.50.40

The values a-d are the damage we can expect within the given time period for that scenario.  To get some grasp if the values, we can set P0=1%, F=0.9, and D1=2 (a very low value).

Screen shot 2014-05-08 at 11.52.29

Clearly, wearing a helmet causes less damage in all scenarios. However, here is the most interesting question: are there any conditions in which a<d, that is, driving voluntarily without a helmet is safer that driving with a mandatory helmet?  We need D1*P0<P0^F, or F < 1+ log(D1)/log(P0). For the sample values above (P0=1%, D1=2) we require that F<85%. If we assume a more realistic D=10, we require F<50%.

Thus, it is possible to envision scenarios in which driving without a helmet is safer. But are these credible scenarios? We would have to assume that mandatory helmets would decrease cycling by tens of percent (even 50%). Possible, but unlikely.

Even more problematic for the author’s case, we would have to assume that the peer pressure of voluntary wearing of helmets would have an effect that is similar to mandatory helmets. Perhaps, but it cannot be as large as the effect of mandatoriness.

There are in fact other arguments against mandatory helmet use. For example, there is a very real phenomenon called the rebound effect. In this case, if safety is improved by a passive solution such as a helmet, then people tend to engage in riskier behaviors because they feel safer doing so. The end result is that safety is not enhanced; it may even be decreased if the perceived improvement is much larger than the actual improvement.

However, this is not really considered in the blog. The core question is: by choosing to cycle without a helmet, is the author significantly increasing the future safety of others, and also by extension himself? Crunching the numbers: no.

Basically, the author is suggesting a massive and highly likely personal sacrifice, for a fairly small and fairly hypothetical improvement. Such a tradeoff is heroic, but it really does not make much sense.

bicycle-crash

Ultra-low-tech lightning detection: business aspects

 

Part 2 of write-up on ultra-low-cost lightning detection network. See Part 1 for background.

[By Jakke Mäkelä and Niko Porjo]

This part summarizes the cost and business case estimates made for the project. The analysis suggests that an extremely low cost might be possible, making the solution suitable for use even in developing countries like Sri Lanka. However, we could not find a way to motivate anyone to fund the R&D part. Thus, we are not pursuing this further for the time being.

BUSINESS ASPECTS

Business case: both hardware cost and data transmission costs are kept so low that building and maintaining network is realistic to perform as a public service. Data transfer can be made over mobile phone network (SMS, GPRS, 3G…) or landline if available. Multiple operators are made to compete to keep data costs down. Hazard indication to end users will need to be wireless to achieve real-time warning.

Benefits

•An exact business case is difficult to determine, as it is for any lightning warning system.

•Situation in Sri Lanka: Tens of deaths reported annually, real number of deaths and injuries unknown. Commercial detection systems too expensive to maintain.

Costs

•Absolute worst-case scenario: If SMS sent less than once per min, reliability of network becomes poor. Thus cannot transfer much less than this. During storms, whole network would need to be transmitting 60*60=3600 SMS/hour. In Finland,  cost of SMS on one operator is ~5 cent, so cost would be 180 EUR/hr for whole network. Assuming 6 hours/ day of storms in active seasons, would mean 30 kEUR/month, which is of course completely unacceptable. But in practice, there are fixed-cost deals available from operators. Multiple operators are absolutely needed in order to maximize price competition and minimize risk of monopoly pricing. But there are SMS-based systems in existence which are affordable (for example Nokia Life Tools http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nokia_Life_Tools) which means that costs could be kept reasonable if there is political push.

•Transfer rate over GPRS, if available, is even in extreme case ~160 B/min or 1kB/hour per station.  For total network, transfer is ~60 kB/hour. Per month, amounts to ~100 MB. On one Finnish operator, GPRS cost can be ~1.5 EUR/MB, so cost would be <200 EUR/month. Clearly GPRS would be the preferable channel where available.

Costs

•Sensors need to be stockpiled to allow them to be replaced quickly if needed, so at least 100 need to be built. Smaller calibration networks can also be developed in parallel and run in a suitable country.

•Main components are radio receiver, GPS clock, GSM/GPRS, processing unit. Battery may be most expensive individual component. ideally will run on AC power, but need to have backup battery/UPS capable of multi-hour operation in case of power failure.  Unit cost of 400EUR should definitely be reachable (cost of full network 40kEUR), though profit margin to manufacturer is then low. This part may need to be subsidized.

•Setting up of network is low-cost since all sensors are autonomous and operate by wireless network. Slow deployment is possible.

•Central unit can be a tabletop PC. Redundancy and power supply needs will increase cost significantly, but main algorithm is simple.

•Operating costs can be minimal if GPRS can be used.

•Cost of transmitting hazard information to users via Cell Broadcast is largest open question.

Funding and implementation

•No funding has been found.

•The organization Geoscientists Without Borders has been funding projects which are similar to the proposal: http://www.seg.org/web/foundation/programs/geoscientists-without-borders

•The target of the pilot is to improve local R&D competence in Sri Lanka, but kicking off the project could require an investment that is difficult to find locally. National foreign aid organizations (Finland or Sweden) might be approached for projects of this type, especially if some of the testing can be done in Europe (enhancing local knowledge also).

Similar projects

•Lots of small semi-official warning systems are known to exist, but limited info in public domain. Data transfer is almost always by fixed-line Internet, which can be unreliable especially in developing countries. Mobile wireless networks have better reliability (though not perfect).

FINAL OUTCOME

We continue to think that the idea would work in principle, but there is no real way to make it successful commercially. We need to feed our families, and cannot do it.

If someone is interested in making this a non-profit open-source project, the crucial documentation is already in the public domain and just needs to be collated together. There are some major engineering issues to be solved, but if profitability is not a requirement, they are likely to be solvable.

 

 

Concept for ultra-low-tech lightning detection

 

As a team, we have a historical trend of failing at everything we try. Common sense dictates that we should try to hide that fact. However, we’ve adopted the opposite strategy. Publishing our failures shows others how they should not proceed, and might give them ideas about how they should proceed (see The SMOS project). What’s in it for us? Not much. But it’s not a big effort to spend a few hours documenting things for the benefit of others.

[By Jakke Mäkelä and Niko Porjo]

This particular concept was a low-tech lightning detection system. Our former employer let us put some effort into looking at a system that could have used a cell phone’s radio circuits for remote lightning detection. The idea was more or less ridiculed, and it never did become commercial in the original form.

However, we found that the idea is less stupid than it sounds. I eventually did my PhD thesis on the physics of such systems. In brief: the crackle that lightning produces in any radio channel can be used to identify and range lightning, giving some pre-warning time before the thunder can be heard.

This is fairly pointless in Scandinavia, but could be significant in tropical areas with more frequent and violent thunderstorms. Both the hardware and software can be extremely simple — basically, an AM radio costing a few dollars can be used. This is thus a technique that might be feasible in developing countries.

We considered Sri Lanka to be a possible place to test the system. It has high mortality from lightning, and a poor economy and infrastructure. Thus, more expensive lightning detection systems do not sound highly realistic there. We also had connections with Sri Lanka during the project and my PhD studies.

Some other researchers and I wrote a peer-reviewed paper on how such a device could be used to detect lightning (Gulyas et al, JoLR 2012). We also wrote a non-peer-reviewed conference paper on how multiple sensors could be used to create a detection network. It’s one of those things that theoretically works. Making it work commercially is a completely different question.

Having been let go from our previous employers, we looked seriously into making this a commercial project. But we came to the conclusion that we would just starve.

The text below is mostly in the form we left it after deciding to stop. It is in draft form, as we do not feel like wasting our time on prettifying it after making a no-go decision. Technically oriented people will understand what we are saying. For readability, we have split the document into two parts; the technical document here, and a commercial document to be published later.

The various entities mentioned here (University of Uppsala, University of Colombo, and Finnish Meteorological Institute) were approached unofficially, but have not formally commented on the idea.

OVERALL PROPOSAL

A loose consortium between for example the University of Colombo, University of Uppsala, Finnish Meteorological Institute, and the proposers could contain all the competence that is needed to implement the project. As of 2012, a new lightning detection chip AS3935 is available from Austriamicrosystems which could form the detector part in the first generation. Thus, the hardware design would be particularly simple now (http://www.ams.com/eng/Lightning-Sensor/AS3935)

POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS 

  • The University of Colombo has experience of the local conditions. Since the target is to transfer all the knowledge to Sri Lanka, Colombo should be the overall lead for the project, with other parties consulting per need.
  • The University of Uppsala has in-depth knowledge of lightning physics and a close working collaboration with Colombo.
  • The Finnish Meteorological Institute has a unit which is experienced with setting up weather-observation systems in developing countries.
  • Mäkelä and Porjo have experience with low-end detector design as well as the network technology.

PURPOSE

•Create an ultra-low-cost lightning detection and warning system for developing countries.

•Pilot project could be run e.g. in Sri Lanka.Technology tests need to be done in a country with accurate lightning location reference data (USA or Europe)

•Technology exists (and multiple technologies possible), missing is a low-cost system to bring the data together and disseminate it to end users. Specifically, low-cost real-time systems are missing.

•Focus is on extreme simplicity, capability to withstand power cuts, quick response times.

•Modular and technology-agnostic (no technology lock-in). Only requirement is that each station be able to provide a distance estimate when a flash is detected.

•Open-source project, with possibility to incorporate better techniques as technology improves.

•Simplest detectors can be built based on public-domain information. Local Sri Lankan R&D can be used to design and build the sensors.

•In the somewhat harsh conditions, it is realistic to assume that some of the measuring sensors will be malfunctioning or offline at any given time. Network algorithm must be made flexible to account for this.

Proposal for demonstrator

•Build network that covers the western coastal region of Sri Lanka.

•Build detection network on principles described in Porjo & Mäkelä 2010. As of 2012, the AS3935 chip from Austriamicrosystems (about 4 USD) is available as a front-end. This information is in the public domain. Simple detectors are also well-known and in the public domain. Some original design work may be needed, but could be done at University of Colombo (academic work). Lowest-cost approach could include a stock Android phone with a Rasberry pi attached to a GPS clock source and a small custom board for the AS3935.

•Sensors by default transmit flash information via mobile phone link (SMS or GPRS). Landlines (Internet access) can be used if available, but they can be expected to be more vulnerable to errors than wireless especially when storms are nearby.

•Flash-by-flash locations are not attempted, only storm risk zones (Gulyas et al 2012). Intra-cloud flashes are difficult to range in any case, and from the viewpoint of security, the most important parameter are the boundaries of the active storm cells.

•Central computer identifies storm risk areas. Sri Lankan Met Institute? Must plan system with high redundancy from the very beginning (at least two computers running separately) because probability of failure is highest exactly when the storms are strongest. The duplicate(s) can also be used to beta test networks whenever stations change.

•Mobile base stations within the risk areas send warning SMS to participating cell phones. GSM standard  allows this since a cell broadcast recommendation exists. But this is potentially difficult issue as requires operator cooperation, as well existence of the GSM network which may be unreliable. Negotiation with operators is needed, and in particular operator lock-in must be avoided (in which an operator can define his own price at will). Note that in principle it is NOT necessary to alert 100% of the people in the area, as it can be expected that people will alert each other. However, 100% should be a target.

•Since ranging accuracy drops radically after 20 km, stations cannot be separated by much more than this. For redundancy reasons, stations every 10 km might be better. In case of Sri Lanka, region of main interest is the coastal strip, thus the network could consist of approx three rows of sensors separated by ~20 km, sensors every 10 km or so.  To protect 200 km strip of coast, need minimum 3×20=60 sensors.

Data transfer needs

•Data transfer needs to be divided among multiple operators to avoid collapse if one operator’s SMS center crashes. Ideally each sensor would have at least two SIM’s (dual-SIM technology already exists) in case one crashes.

•Data transfer from sensors is to be by SMS or GPRS. Since locations of stations is known, only need per flash time (to 1-sec GPS accuracy) and intensity (8 bits would be sufficient if calibration is OK). Since we want to allow possibility of direction-finding at least in the future,  8 bits allows 1.4% angular resolution. Time can highly compressed if for example nearest hour is assumed to be known, in which case 12 bits is enough to code nearest second. Some kind of reliability value of a few bits would also be useful. → Each flash could be coded in 32 bits.

•SMS spec has 1120 bits per message (160 7-bit characters as in SMS, equivalent to 140 8-bit characters as in Twitter).  Thus up to 35 flashes could be coded in a single SMS. Since flash rates are essentially never 30 flashes/minute (in extreme cases ground flashes up to 4-6 flashes/min, cloud flashes theoretically 10 times higher). Sending SMS once per minute would be sufficient even in case of an extreme storm.

Part 2 on business aspects: click here 

 

 

Epilogue: Troglodyte is not dead even though it is buried

This is a comment related to Jakke’s post about ramping Troglodyte down as a project.

When I face a mirror, I see the person to blame. My personal input was never on the required level.

I have a lot of started ongoing studies, but it is really tedious work. I believe one shouldn’t report much before knowing the results. It is also a reason why one needs to be fully committed. In spirit I am, but seemingly not in flesh. Not enough.

I have an excuse. That excuse led me to a project with a monthly salary. Hopefully we can build something great there.

Money and salary is the dilemma we have faced several times with Jakke and Niko during the last two years. There is so much work to be done, helpless to help and projects to start. And still we are in a situation where we all have to decide what is important and what is not.

We do it everyday, each of us.

An old car salesman told me 29 years ago that money is such an old innovation that everyone must have it by now. Or by then, since it is almost 30 years later now. There must be even more money to go around.

But in the areas of Humanitarian IPR or Humanitarian Work we don’t see it. Perhaps we need more old car salesmen there.

We and many others are not asking for much or for something impossible. But even that is too much. Big part of it is due to institutional problems (not challenges) buried in the way how they behave. We have touched those in our previous posts.

The system(s) need to see the money coming back and multiplying on its way. Human life is not money, even if it multiplies over time. The systems do not encourage to focus on something that would be important and could be done. They focus on what can be done and what makes money.

Yes, I am whining and am selfish.

I am not desperate enough or driven enough to forget everything else and drive just this one thing. I am in too good a position that food and shelter are not my problems. I too am thinking how to accumulate wealth to get me over the next dry season.

My dry season is related to work with salary, not a physical draught with famine.

I am ashamed, it is only the image in the mirror and the ones near me that I value high enough.

It is not impossible to try and continue to change the status quo. To use effort and money to build something good and humanly valuable. Something that is not valuable only in monetary terms and measured in monetary terms.

Such work takes time.

We, together with APO and humanitarian IPR, are on a path to something we do not know where it leads us. It does not have a name.

We just know we can do more.
And we will.

I am sure we are not alone.

We will continue to change the thinking one sentence and a comment at a time. It just takes longer.

Once in a while we have regular jobs, but the face in the mirror reminds us that we have possibilities to do something good with the tools we have been given and have gathered.

For us it is evolution over revolution, affecting the system with its democratic rules. Respecting our societies and everyone around us.

I don’t think the world is ready yet, we have potential for so much more.
All of us.

Translate »