Category: Security

Ideas related to security and safety

When trash burns wrong, part 1

To take Zygomatica beyond the realm of academic speculation, I have decided to hitch myself to a concrete issue which I have little competence in. A municipal solid-waste incinerator is being planned in Turku, quite near where I live. In any human activity, things can always go haywire. How can things go wrong with the incinerator, and how can we prepare for them?  [Click here for Finnish version]

This first blog is simply a summary of what I have learned in some days of browsing. I think I have most of the facts right.  Concretely, I am a member of the Turku section of the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, and have helped comment the Environmental Impact Assessment of the planned incinerator. Being a member of the Association helps find information, but also allows me to affect things rather than just theorizing about them. All views and opinions expressed here are absolutely my own, however.

Trash incineration is a difficult issue politically, ethically, environmentally, and technically. I don’t actually know my opinion yet. I live quite close to the planned incinerator, but am not automatically against it. In this series I will take a laser focus which is the same whether I end up being for or against the incinerator: I will focus on the possibility of major accidents, how to prepare for them, how to inform the population, and how to  recover from them. My essential interest is in the finding and disseminating of information.

In one sentence: an incinerator is a huge furnace. The waste from trucks is dumped into silos and fed into the incinerator (Figure 1). The temperature needs to be at least 800 degrees in order to break up the toxic materials. The process can generate both heat and electricity. The burning produces flue gases which need to be cleaned (Figure 2). The clean-up residue (5% or the original mass) is considered toxic waste. The bottom ash weighs about 15% of the original mass. If the incineration was successful, the bottom ash can be used for example in landfills and construction.


Figure 1: The furnace system. (Source: TSJ:n YVA-dokumentti).

Figure 2: The cleaning system. (Source: TSJ:n YVA-dokumentti).

In Turku, the planned amount of waste would be 150,00 tons per year (one dump truck an hour). About 8,000 tons of toxic waste will be produced (one dump truck per day), and 25,000 tons of non-toxic bottom ash (a few dump trucks per day).

Before the 1980’s, little attention was paid to environmental matters. Incinerators produced significant amounts of dioxins and toxic heavy metals. When reality struck, incinerators disappeared from Finland; for many years, Turku had the only functioning incinerator in the country. In new incinerators, the emission levels have been set lower than for other energy-producing plants. If everything works correctly, the emission levels are considered acceptable (whether they really are acceptable is an issue which I will not get into here).

However, one thing is pure common sense: if a plant operates for thirty years, everything will not work correctly all the time. Something will happen: fires, failures of the filtering system, industrial actions, accidental contamination by toxic wastes, unexpected chemical reactions, failed maintenance, human errors…. If an accident can happen, it will happen, somewhere, eventually.

This common sense should ideally be supported by facts. And there is the catch: facts are hard to come by, at least from easily available public sources. Manufacturers and operators do not report malfunctions automatically. Accident reports can occasionally be found, but not systematically. That, then, is the theme of this series. Based on the limited information that is available, I will try to determine what can go wrong in an incinerator, and how the locals can deal with such malfunctions.

I feel no hysteria. Even if a fire is set off, it will end when there is nothing more left to burn. An explosion like the Flixborough disaster is not possible. Even in the (theoretical) case of an explosion, the shock wave is not an issue. The release of hazardous substances is the core issue; right now, I have no real idea how much and what types of materials might be released.

It is certainly possible that I will find nothing dramatic. In that case, I will report that nothing dramatic was found. Time will tell.

Is aviation safety a shameful thing?

 

“Why do airlines stay so silent about safety issues? “

By almost any measure, flying is the safest way to move long distances. Most airlines make massive investments into safety. Yet to our surprise, we have found that it is difficult for a casual outsider to find out precisely what the airlines are doing with that invested money.  All airlines have a safety culture, yet this culture is opaque to outsiders. I found that only 35% of airlines even wish to mention safety on their web pages.

Silence certainly does not benefit the customers of an airline. Customers should be able to make informed choices, and this includes understanding the safety record. How can the average person find such information? It  doesn’t benefit the airlines either. In a culture of silence, safety only becomes visible when disaster strikes. The easiest way for an outsider to understand the airline’s safety culture is to read accident investigation reports on how it failed (from NTSB, AAIB, OTKES, SHK, BEA, and the like). This is hardly positive advertising.

I asked a simple question: just how opaque do the airlines want to be?  To answer, I went clicking through the web pages of 83 major airlines. The scanning was purposely quick, to simulate an ordinary customer who wants to know what general attitude the airline has toward safety. If a company provided concrete safety information, it was marked as “safety-positive”. Full report (pdf): Airlines are safe; why try to hide it.

I found only 35% of airlines to be safety-positive. To put it another way,  almost 65% of airlines try to downplay the role of safety, to the level of ignoring the question altogether in their communications.

I made some further analyses to determine what might lie behind this fact.  It is important to realize that the essential safety standards around the world are quite similar. All of the airlines in this sample fulfill some standards that could be legitimately used to show that there is a safety culture in place. It is very much a communications decision whether or not the airline wishes to emphasize this point.

I gave the benefit of the doubt as much as possible.  A sentence on a “safety as our priority” means nothing. However, any attempt at a more concrete desciption (even a clumsy one)  was credited. Information on engineering, maintenance, or safety-related technology was considered safety-positive even if the term “safety” was not used explicitly. Such information at least gives the impression that aviation is a technical activity requiring technical care. The analysis is not about how slick the presentation is; it is about whether a good-faith attempt is made.

This is crucial when comparing airline to airline. A poor airline may have just one page of information about the company. If that single page contains a single paragraph about the safety standards that the company follows, then the airline is safety-positive. At the other extreme, a large airline may have dozens of flashy pages on issues like corporate social responsibility, environment, and sponsorships. If such a company fails to even mention safety as a topic, it is deliberate.

The call was surprisingly easy to make. Airlines seem to either put a heavy emphasis on safety, or else avoid the topic altogether; there is not much middle ground.  The results were somewhat surprising. Only 35% of airlines even mentioned safety or technical issues. The majority essentially try to paint an image of aviation as a non-technical activity that entails no risk. Some other key findings (more extensively discussed in the report):


  • 65% of the safety-positive airlines are from developing countries with poor track records of safety. Africa and the former Soviet Union were heavily represented.  Quite clearly, concrete safety actions are clearly used to to improve trust in the airline’s safety.
  • Safety-positiveness is not just a “weapon of the weak”; large and successful airlines such as British Airways, Air Canada, Air Berlin, and All Nippon Airways all had extensive safety sections.
  • Two airlines, Garuda Indonesia and Pakistan International Airways, have briefly been on the EU blacklist of airlines banned from flying to the EU due to poor security. Interestingly, the safety sections of these airlines were among the most extensive in the sample.
  • Only 2 low-cost carriers out of 16 (12%) were safety-positive. The web page information for many low-cost carriers is extremely scanty in any case, so there may be a general attitude toward minimal communication. However, the two counterexamples (Norwegian and Pegasus) suggest that a low-cost structure does not fundamentally require such reticence; those two companies have a very strong focus on safety.
  • A striking feature is that US companies seem to be the most averse to safety-positiveness; of the 9 US companies studied, none mentioned safety at all.
  • A similar reluctance was seen in Middle Eastern companies, where only one of six companies had any safety information.

These results do not imply anything about what airlines should do; they simply point out what the airlines are currently doing. However, the scatter in the results does suggest that there is no fundamental reason to keep safety information hidden; transparency about safety is a communications and business decision.

Since the results from this initial study were so intriguing, we have launched a new Zygomatica project to find out more.

Data transparency as a safety feature

 

It seems to me that situational awareness of cruise ship passengers is not considered important, I have a problem with that. It is perfectly clear that going on a cruise means an increased level of risk. The risk is larger during a storm than it is during calm summer weather. Passengers need truthful information about the service they are purchasing. Informed choices can’t be made without adequate information. I therefore suggest that the amount of safety-related information available to passengers should be significantly increased.

A good place to start is history (examples here are from Finland as this text is a translation of a Finnish original). In 2005, there was a fire on board the M/S Amorella, the crew extinguished it with firm professionalism. For some reason, there was no press release nor were the shareholders informed through a stock exchange release. The situation on board the ship was over at 22.59, at which point the passengers were allowed back inside. There was a stock exchange release by Viking Line next morning at 09.00, dealing with the rising cost of fuel. Yet there was a fire, it was extinguished, and as always in situations like this, something was learned. In this case the investigation resulted in five recommendations which should have raised discussion among the professionals. To be credible when talking about safety history should be visible, smaller and larger mistakes should be acknowledged, and above all the company should show what was learned and how it is showing up in the everyday activities. To be fair to the Viking Line company, it is not alone in its  amnesia; the Silja Line history shows no memory of this steering-loss incident in 1995, nor does the Tallink history remember this attempt to widen the route near Kustaanmiekka. But there is an amusing mention of how the trade in duty free beer is really picking up.

I made a quick search of the www.costacruise.com web site to see what they tell about safety. Nothing much. The only reference I could find related to occupational safety. From the aviation world, searching www.finnair.com or www.lufthansa.com sites produced little of note either. There was slightly more information on the Viking Line web pages. The page could be found by searching for “safety” in the search field. Safety information on the Tallink Silja web pages was more difficult to find and scantier. Personally, I found the lengthier information on the Viking web pages more reassuring, a sign that safety is being taken seriously.

This situation is slightly strange. At least in the case of airlines, safety work is a significant effort and a never-ending process. One would imagine that the same applies to cruise ships. In both cases, it is next to impossible for a customer to check the real situation. Are the companies afraid of losing customers? Maybe. This could certainly happen if the message is ham-fisted: “If our service fails, you can die”. However, by using some money one can buy a presentation that brings out the facts in a more neutral way. At the same time best experts on aviation or maritime safety are likely to be found outside the companies themselves. If safety thinking is opened up on the Internet, it would be possible to draw in researchers essentially for free to comment on weaknesses. A “no communication” model eliminates this possibility.

Safety must be priority number one in all shipping, especially passenger ships. This should be visible in the organization all the way to the top. The board of directors should include a person with a publicly stated overall responsibility for safety. That person should have sufficient experience and clout to actively question weaknesses in the procedures.

At the other end, the safety organization and procedures should be opened to the passengers at all levels. Let us take the concrete example of a fire which requires evacuation. Should those partying in the disco go to their cabins to get warm clothing? This is an important question, since even an hour of waiting in the cold without adequate clothing can seriously hinder a passenger’s ability to act, and can endanger the evacuation process. Perhaps there are procedures for this, but how are we to know this? We cannot know, since we have not been given any information on what kinds of plans the ship’s crew has.

Locations of ships can be seen here and sea ice conditions can be seen here, weather forecasts can be found here. There is plenty of information on parameters that affect the speed, comfort, and safety of the trip. If the shipping company adds information on the ship’s performance and safety, such as any hazardous substances, narrows on the navigation path, navigational information such as a radar picture, and information from the fire warning system, passengers would have almost the same information as the crew on the bridge. By adding information that normally interests the passengers, such as the opening times of the buffet and an opportunity to reserve seats there, there is enough information to create a mobile application that anyone travelling with a smartphone would want to have available.

Detailed information may not interest everyone, but based on this information it is possible to create an index showing the current safety situation. Currently a large part of the problem is the coarse-grained approach, in which there are just two modes: 1) keep on partying, 2) we are in major trouble. Modern technology and enlightened customers would enable much more fine-grained communication.

An application like this would require a mobile device compatible wireless network that operates inside the ship. When such a network exists, it can also be used to transmit emergency information to the passengers. The report on the Isabella accident of 2001 showed problems when dealing with a multilingual environment.  As soon as instructions had been given in Finnish, the clamor level rose, making it difficult to hear announcements made in other languages. In such circumstances, it would be beneficial to have the information available in written form, in multiple languages. Some people may also find it easier to follow written instructions rather than trying to listen to spoken instructions.

I would distribute almost all of the information in the ship’s systems both inside and outside the ship in a standardized format that allows third-party use and would allow the authorities to maintain real-time situational awareness. Due both to long distances and difficult conditions, it can take hours for help to arrive. Proactive reaction to developing incidents can thus significantly alter the outcome. A culture that values autonomy and self-sufficiency above all must be changed. When and where possible self-sufficiency should be the goal, but in case of a deviation from normal one should prepare, automatically, for the need to receive external assistance by communicating all relevant information .

At some point increasing safety will be limited by rising costs. I would like to see analyses in which these limits are challenged. Estimate the cost of a shipboard Wi-Fi system, balance the cost against the advantages, and make a decision based on this balance. It may be necessary to keep some calculations as trade secrets, but even there it is worthwhile to truly analyze what needs to be secret and what does not.

A functioning safety culture requires acceptance of the fact that mistakes will be made and they must be learned from. However, it is impossible for external parties to assess quality of the safety culture if no information on that culture is openly available.Data transparency  as a safety feature

Data transparency in shipping safety: good or bad idea?

 

Radical transparency is an intriguing school of thought, with the philosophy that the best society is a transparent society. In other words, all data that can be opened should be opened. I find such transparency an interesting concept, and in many cases probably worth aiming for. The key question is: what is a realistic environment in which to begin experimenting with it? I focus here on one tightly restricted area: data transparency in shipping safety. [Finnish version: Click here]

For a slightly perspective on this issue by Niko Porjo, see here.

At the moment,  international standards require large ships to transmit AIS information. At minimum, this information contains, in standardized format, the ship’s identity, location, speed, and bearing. The AIS information is transmitted in the clear and its purpose is to help ships maintain positional awareness of other traffic.  Internet distribution of the data originally raised some controversy, but in practice the controversy is over: the AIS information is public.

It is quite sensible to ask a further question: should even more information from the ships be openly available? There are good reasons to ask this question; above all, in an emergency it would make the passengers active participants rather than passive subjects. It would also help to show up poor safety practices that would remain invisible in a closed environment. The technical problem can be stated quite simply: should the information currently collected by the black box  be available and public (although not necessarily in real time)? More radically, it is technically feasible to make all the information that is available on the bridge available to the public. Should it be made available?

Unfortunately, I tend to arrive at a pessimistic outcome for this specific case.  Openness would benefit the overall system. Unfortunately, it would not benefit any of the individual players, at least in the beginning stages. The problem with transparency in this particular area is that the first adopter ends up taking most of the risk. Although radical transparency is a good concept to aim for, shipping security does not seem like a reasonable platform in which to start experimenting with it.

The authorities cannot be bossed around

In practice, security is defined and enforced by national or international authorities. In a democratic system, it is in principle possible to force the authorities to make good decisions. Unfortunately, in a democratic system this is also painfully difficult in practice. Authorities are dependent on what  legislators decide. Legislation in turn is a slow process, undergoing massive lobbying from established interestes, and requiring a significant push from citizens.  Based on the lukewarm reception these issues are getting, it does not seem that there is any real  political push in this direction.

Laws and directives change most rapidly through major accidents, which lead to security recommendations.  Even then, the new directives may or may not be followed adequately, especially if they require significant amounts of money. Waiting for the authorities to act requires patience and (unfortunately) often new accidents. This path does work, but is not likely to lead to rapid or radical solutions.

Anonymization does not work

In order to balance between data transparency and personal privacy, security-related  information should be anonymized.   Unfortunately, this does not work in the Internet age, where all information (whether correct or not) will be on Twitter within minutes of an accident. The most tragic failure of anonymization is the  Überlingen air accident  of 2002, in which two aircraft collided. The  investigation report concluded that it was a system-wide problem, and no single individual was to blame. Nevertheless, a man who  lost his family in the accident blamed the air traffic controller, found out his identity and home address, and murdered him.

The Überlingen case is extreme, but in an open system there is no automatic mechanism to protect those initially blamed for the accident. It is a serious scenario is that in any accident, the people potentially responsible will be identified immediately, they will be blamed by the media, their personal information will be found immediately, and Internet mobbing could start immediately. The risk may look small now, but already cyber-bullying in South Korea shows that a risk exists. How many people would be willing to work under such circumstances?

Data without metadata is nothing

The technical problems are considerable. The AIS parameters are standardized tightly and are easily understandable.  If more generic information is to be transmitted, then its interpretation becomes problematic. Raw data is just rows of numbers;  processing, interpretation, and displaying are what make it into information.  Someone must do this, must be paid to do it, and must be responsible for quality control.

Some parameters will be considered trade secrets by the shipping companies (or at least in a gray area). Realistically speaking,  any shipping company will either not want to do such an analysis, or will want to keep the results secret. It is certainly possible to force a company to make the raw data available. Without extra incentives, it is barely realistic to expect the company to make the data available in a form which could be easily utilized by competitors.

Transparency benefits the unscrupulous

Transparency is an equalizing safety factor when all parties have the same information on all parties.  If one party stops sharing information, it creates a business advantage for itself (even more so if it begins to distort it). No idealism can change this fact; surveillance and enforcement are needed. The enforcement needs to be global. It can be argued that for technologies such as nuclear energy such a global enforcement system already exists; that is true, but nuclear energy was born in completely different historical circumstances than shipping, and was in fat able to start from a clean table.

Open real-time information also makes piracy easier. More information means more opportunities to plan attacks. Merchant ships near the coast of Somalia will certainly not be willing to participate in experiments in radical transparency.

Terrorism is invoked too easily, but it cannot be ignored. Any transparency model must accept the brutal truth that there are destructive entities. The sinking of a large passenger ship might not even be the worst-case scenario; societies can recover from large losses of life very rapidly, even though the scars are horrible.   A more worrisome scenario might be an  Exxon Valdez-type massive oil leak event next to a nuclear power plant.

What can we do?

Many people reflexively oppose this type of radical transparency, whether with good reason or by knee-jerk reflex. How could they be motivated to at least try?  Even if calculations clearly show that transparency is useful for the whole system in the long run, people are irrational and think in the short run. Given that the early adopters take a risk, how would this risk be compensated to them?  Shipping has a long history and legacy practices which are difficult to overcome. Radical transparency is something that absolutely should be tested in a suitable environment. However, I am forced to conclude that shipping safety is simply not a sensible environment in which to start.  

 

Tiedon avaaminen laivaliikenteessä: hyvä vai huono idea?

Radikaali avoimuus on koulukunta, jonka mukaan paras yhteiskunta olisi läpinäkyvä yhteiskunta: lähes kaikki informaatio olisi saatavilla ja vapaasti jaettavissa.  Itse pidän radikaalia avoimuutta kiinnostavana ajatuksena, ja ilman muuta kokeilemisen arvoisena. Olennainen kysymys kuuluukin: mikä on sopiva ympäristö kokeilujen aloittamisen?  Keskityn tässä yhteen konkreettiseen tapaukseen: avoimuuteen laivojen turvallisuustekijänä. [Link: English version].

Niko Porjon kirjoitus samasta aiheesta, hieman eri lähtökohdista: klikkaa tästä.

Tällä hetkellä kansainväliset standardit vaativat suuria laivoja lähettämään tilannetietojaan  AIS-järjestelmän kautta. Tieto kertoo minimissään laivan tunnuksen, paikan, nopeuden, ja suunnan. AIS-tieto on käytännössä julkista, koska se lähetetään salaamattomana ja sen tarkoitus on nimenomaan helpottaa tilannekuvan muodostamista. Tiedon vapaa Internet-jakelu sen sijaan on herättänyt polemiikkia, mutta käytännössä AIS-tieto on jo julkista ja reaaliaikaista Internetissä.

On perusteltua esittää jatkokysymys: tulisiko tietojen olla vielä laajemmin julkisia ja avoimia? On esitetty perusteluja sille, miksi näin voisi olla.  Ennen muuta datan avoimuus tekisi hätätilanteissa matkustajista aktiivisia toimijoita passiivisten uhrien sijaan.  Lisäksi avoimuus paljastaisi sellaisia toimntakulttuurin ja -tapojen ongelmia, jotka suljetussa järjestelmässä jäisivät piiloon. Teknisen kysymyksen voi muotoilla näin: pitäisikö laivan mustan laatikon tiedon olla avointa ja julkista (vaikkakaan ei välttämättä reaaliaikaisesti saatavilla)? Puhtaasti teknisellä tasolla olisi jopa mahdollista, että avointa olisi kaikki se tieto, joka komentosillalla on käytettävissä. Kannattaisiko sen olla jakelussa?

Tässä nimenomaisessa tapauksessa päädyn vastentahtoisesti melko negatiiviseen lopputulemaan: Kokonaisuuden kannalta avoimuudesta olisi hyötyä. Jokaisen yksittäisen toimijan kannalta avoimuudesta on kuitenkin etupäässä riskejä ja haittaa, varsinkin alkuvaiheessa.   Avoimuuden ongelma tässä tapauksessa on se, että kenenkään ei oikeastaan kannata olla ensimmäinen.  Laivaturvallisuus ei siis käytännössä ole ensimmäinen kokeilualusta, jossa radikaalia avoimuutta kannattaisi lähteä testaamaan.

 Viranomaisia ei voi määräillä

Viime kädessä avoimuus- ja turvallisuusasiat vaativat viranomaismääräyksiä. Periaatteessa ratkaisu on yksinkertainen: pakotetaan viranomaiset määräämään oikein. Demokratiassa tämä on jopa mahdollista. Valitettavasti se on demokratiassa myöskin piinallisen hidasta. Viranomaiset toimivat niiden valtuuksien varassa, jotka lainsäätäjä niille antaa. Lainsäädäntö taas on hidas ja monimutkainen prosessi, altis eri tahojen lobbaukselle, ja vaatii merkittävän työnnön kansalaisilta.  Realistisesti katsottuna ainakaan Suomessa ei tällaista työntöä ole.   Tämäntyyppisiä asioita Suomessa ylipäätään selkeästi ajavat lähinnä EFFI (1500 jäsentä) sekä Piraattipuolue (3000 jäsentä, äänimäärä eduskuntavaaleissa n 15000 eli 0.5%). Eduskunnassa teemoja käsitellään varsin niukasti. Aihealue on poliittista marginaalia.

Nopeimmin lait ja turvallisuussäädökset muuttuvat suuronnettomuuksien kautta; niissä annetut turvallisuussuositukset pyritään ottamaan vakavasti. Toisaalta  silloinkaan ei ole mitenkään selvää, että suosituksia todellisuudessa halutaan toteuttaa, varsinkaan jos ne maksavat jotakin.  Viranomaisratkaisujen odottaminen vaatii kärsivällisyyttä ja (valitettavasti) hyvin usein uusia onnettomuuksia. Tämä polku kyllä toimii, mutta kovin nopeita ja radikaaleja ratkaisuja siltä on turha odottaa.

 Anonymisointi ei suojaa

Toimijoiden oikeus- ja henkilökohtaisen turvan takia kaikki tieto tulisi anonymisoida ennen julkistamista. Tähän onkin pyritty nykyaikaisessa onnettomuustutkinnassa.  Käytännössä se ei Internetin aikakaudella toimi. Traagisin esimerkki on Überlingenin lento-onnettomuus vuonna 2002, jossa kaksi konetta törmäsi ilmassa. Tutkintaraportin mukaan onnettomuuden aiheutti pitkä tapahtumaketju, jonka takia vuorossa ollut lennonjohtaja ei ollut varsinainen syyllinen tapahtumaan. Onnettomuudessa  perheensä menettänyt mies kuitenkin piti lennonjohtajaa syyllisenä, sai hänen osoitetietonsa selville, ja murhasi hänet.

Überlingenin on ääritapaus, mutta avoimessa järjestelmässä ei ole automaattista mekanismia, joka kykenisi suojelemaan syytettyjä.  Mikäli tiedon avoimuus entisestään lisääntyy, on vakavasti otettava mahdollisuus että oletettu vastuuhenkilö tunnistetaan  välittömästi, hänen tietonsa ovat saatavilla, media ruokkii hysteriaa, ja Internetissä (ja ehkä myös sen ulkopuolella) alkaa ajojahti.  Tällä hetkellä tämäntyyppinen riski voi näyttää pieneltä; esimerkiksi Etelä-Koreassa se ei kuitenkaan ole ennenkuulumatonta.  Kuinka moni on valmis työskentelemään tällaisessa ympäristössä, ja millä ehdoilla?

Data ilman metadataa ei ole mitään

Tekniset ongelmat eivät ole ylipääsemättömiä, mutta ne ovat kuitenkin huomattavia. AIS-järjestelmässä parametrit on määritelty ja standardoitu tarkkaan, ja ne ovat selkeästi ymmärrettäviä.  Mikäli tietoa sen sijaan jaetaan laajemmin, sen tulkinta teettää todellista työtä. Raakadata yksinään on vain kasa numeroita. Sillä ei yksin tee mitään, vaan se täytyy pystyä prosessoimaan jotta se olisi käyttökelpoisessa muodossa. Jonkun täytyy tämä prosessointi tehdä ja siitä vastata.

Osa parametreista, esimerkiksi polttoaineekulutus, menee selkeästi alueelle jonka laivanvarustamot katsovat liikesalaisuuksiksi. Joka tapauksessa on suuri määrä tietoa, joka on harmaalla alueella.  Monien refleksiivinen tahtotila on tiedon salaaminen. Yhtiöt voidaan ehkä pakottaa antamaan raakadata käyttöön. Sen sijaan on vaikeampi tarkkaan määritellä, mitä tarkoittaa “käyttökelpoinen muoto”. Tämä pätee silloinkin, jos yhtiöt toimivat täydessä yhteistyössä; mitä monipuolisempaa dataa halutaan esittää, sitä vaikeampaa sen standardointi on. Standardointi ei myöskään ole ilmaista. Kuka maksaa tämän työn?

Avoimuus suosii häikäilemättömiä

Avoimuus toimii parhaiten turvallisuustekijänä silloin, jos kaikilla on käytettävissä sama tieto kaikista. Jos sen sijaan joku toimijoista panttaa tai jopa väärentää tietoa jolla on kilpailullista merkitystä, toimijalla on helposti suora kilpailuetu.  Mikään idealismi ei tätä faktaa poista.  Käytännössä on oltava sekä valvonta- että rangaistusmekanismit joilla huijaaminen voidaan estää. Näiden pitää lisäksi toimia kansainvälisellä tasolla. Esimerkiksi ydinvoimalle tällainen kansainvälinen kontrollijärjestelmä on olemassa. Ydinvoiman historiallinen tausta on kuitenkin täysin erilainen; ydinvoiman kanssa päästiin käytännössä aloittamaan puhtaalta pöydältä. Laivaliikenteellä tätä mahdollisuutta ei ole.

Avoimuus suosii myös helposti rikollisuutta. Mitä enemmän tietoa on saatavilla, sitä helpompi on suunnitella hyökkäyksiä. Suomen oloissa ajatus kuulostaa kaukaiselta (joskin myös täällä on ollut Arctic Sean kaltaisia tapauksia). Muualla maailmassa riskit sen sijaan ovat aivan toisenlaiset.  Somalian merirosvoalueilla eivät yksinkertaisesti päde samanlaiset avoimuussäännöt kuin Itämerellä.

Terrorismiin vedotaan liian herkästi, mutta unohtaa sitä ei voi.  Avoimenkin mallin tulee lähteä siitä inhorealistisesta lähtökohdasta, että ympärillä on tahoja jotka haluavat tuottaa tuhoa. Ristelyaluksen upottaminen ei tässä tapauksessa ole edes pahin skenaario.  Monen tuhannen ihmisen hengen menetys olisi toki valtava tragedia. Yhteiskunnat toipuvat kuitenkin valtavistakin menetyksistä, vaikka arvet jäävätkin.  Sen sijaan esimerkiksi Exxon Valdez-tyyppinen mutta tahallinen öljyvuoto vaikkapa ydinvoimalan vieressä aiheuttaisi merkittävää tuhoa.

Mitä voidaan tehdä?

Monet ihmiset ja yritykset  vierastavat tämäntyyppistä avoimuutta, joko hyvin perustein tai ilman. Miten heidät saisi tästä kiinnostumaan?  Vaikka laskelmat osoittaisivatkin, että avoimuus on pitkällä aikaskaalalla eduksi, lyhyellä skaalalla avoimuus näyttää tuottavan etupäässä riskejä. Miten nämä korvataan riskin ottajalle? Käytännössä radikaaliin avoimuuteen pyrkiminen vaatisi laivaliikenteeseen niin suuria yht’äkkisiä muutoksia, etten näe realistisena olettaa sellaisia. Radikaalia avoimuutta on järkevä testata jossakin ympäristössä. Laivaturvallisuus tuskin on sopiva ympäristö, vaan on järkevämpi hakea testialustaa muualta.

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